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The critical choice for the Smith Commission and any subsequent political negotiations over
devolution in Scotland and beyond, is between:
A Union based on a rationale of separation, where ‘sharing’ of power across the UK at
Westminster will require to be justified on an on-going basis in terms of effectiveness, efficiency
and legitimacy
or
A Union based on a rationale of sharing, which views the Union as existing because it
encapsulates and can protect a set of common baseline values to which constituent parts of the
Union subscribe to and have a stake in
Smith and the Context
The push is now on to define ‘home rule’ or ‘devo-max’ for Scotland.  All four main parties have made
a public submission to the Smith Commission, and the deadline for wider submissions closed on
Friday. The Scottish Government have published substantial new proposals which essentially
propose devolving all power except aspects of monetary policy, Westminster elections and political
system, and aspects of international foreign policy. The Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and
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Conservatives have essentially publicly re-committed to their pre-referendum documents as their
starting points, which to different degrees contemplate further devolution of further tax and welfare-
related powers (see submissions on Smith Commission website).  The Conservatives affirm their
commitment to the Strathclyde Commission proposals, but interestingly note that these are ‘a floor
and not a ceiling’.  The Labour Party re-commits to the Lamont Devolution Commission proposals,
and the Liberal Democrats to Menzies Campebell’s 2012 Home Rule and Community Rule
Commission, Federalism Report.
There is overlap between the proposals which potentially could be horse-traded between parties to
come up with some new amalgam of powers.  However reaching a deal this way will be difficult to
achieve, and is likely to result in a constitutionally incoherent and unpredictable set of arrangements. 
Constitutionally incoherent because they will be driven by trade-offs rather than any coherent political
or constitutional vision for either Scotland or the UK.  Unpredictable because they will not focus on
how people’s lives are affected.  Matters such as access to health and welfare, capacity to move
within the jurisdiction without bureaucracy, or to trade without different tax regimes - all critical
objections to independence – will once again come into the frame, but in contrast to independence, in
ways which lack the same level of clarity, transparency or public awareness and debate.
The Important Choice: Separation or Sharing?
Lurking in this detail, however, is a critical choice for the nature of the Union that remains that
deserves more overt attention. That choice is between separation or sharing.
Separation focuses on an autonomy model of devolution and understands the critical negotiation to
be between how delimit Scottish power and Westminster power respectively.  The separation model
of devo-max views the Union’s central justification as one rooted in pragmatism and functionalism. 
Centralised power and the need for ‘Union’ is justified only to the extent that it can be argued to be
more effective at delivering select public goods such as macro economic policy and defence.  Where
it cannot be demonstrated to be more effective than devolved or local government, it is redundant. 
The separation model of Union dominates current submissions and debate.  This is unsurprising. 
The separation model is pre-figured in the current devolution arrangements and most obviously
appears to be an adequate response to independence demands.  Again unsurprisingly, the Scottish
Government proposals set out the most robust vision of how extensive a form of separation can sit
with the retention of the Union (but of course this is also what Brown seemed to promise).  However,
some common ground as to a separation approach lies can be seen also in ‘the Vow’ and the other
parties’ submissions to Smith.  These repeatedly contemplate some more aspects of taxation and
welfare to be devolved, while seeking to retain control over macro-economic policy (or ‘prosperity’),
and defence and aspects of international relations (‘security’). 
Separation also has historical precedence: as the term ‘Home Rule’ was intended to point to, a clear
precedence for the separation model can be found in the Irish and Scottish Home Rule Bills of the
turn of the century before last, and subsequent Government of Ireland Acts of 1914 and 1920, on
which the Scottish government proposals are fairly closely modelled. 
Sharing, in contrast understands some more substantive content to the Union to underpin it, rooted
in shared values and common political commitments.  This model  views some substantive vision of
Union as important to its existence.  This substantive vision flows from the idea that the United
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Kingdom is the relevant political community which generates the constitution. This sharing
understanding of Union would approach more devolution from the perspective of seeking to define
and protect some vision of what common values lay at the heart of that political community.  While
British constitutional arrangements are often vaunted for their pragmatic rather than ideological
nature, this is quite different from completely conceding the UK as merely a sort of micro-1950s-EU
of nation state-lets. 
Back to the Future: The Negotiating Dynamics and Consequences for the Union
Separation. The consequences for the Union of negotiations focused on separation – already
emerging -  are easy to predict.  Anyone in doubt should merely re-read their Dicey. The negotiation
over this form of Home Rule essentially opens up a negotiation over the amount of separation, the
consequences for where finance is raised, and the consequence for Scottish representation in
Westminster. 
The trade-offs are fairly obvious and simple.  More powers to Scotland, more finance-raising in
Scotland, and accordingly, the less Scottish representatives need to be involved in Westminster
(because it will have very little remaining role in Scotland).  As the Home Rule Bills and Acts of a
century ago show, the logical implication of separation is to limit the participation of devolved
politicians in the Westminster Parliament.  In the ultimate Government of Ireland Act 1920, the model
was to reduce to the number of Irish MPs, so that they had a much reduced chance of holding the
balance of power in a hung parliament (and remember these too were Coalition times).   However, in
earlier Home Rule Bills the removal of Irish MPs was more radical: Irish MPs were to be removed
completely from the Westminster parliament, with provision to re-call them for the purpose only of
re-configuring the Home Rule arrangements themselves.   
Objections to Home Rule at that time, were that it would create the British Parliament as two
Parliaments (see similar objections to Cameron’s linking of Scottish Home Rule to ‘English votes’
to-day as a ‘logical absurdity’ by Vernon Bogdanor).  Dicey argued that Gladstone’s Home Rule
Model of 1886 would create the British Parliament as two Parliaments: first, the British Parliament as
it had existed prior to union with Ireland, and second, as an ‘Imperial Parliament’ to comprise the
British Parliament plus members of the Irish Parliament, which had an authority only over the terms
of Home Rule itself.
Dicey Turns in his Grave at the new English Unionism.  The Scottish Government has not
addressed the question of representation in Westminster.  But of course David Cameron has.  On the
day after the referendum he was quick off-the-mark to link more powers for Scotland with fewer at
Westminster, and the idea (not new of course) that Scottish MPs should have no role in English-only
legislation.   There is a great irony in this equation now being pushed by English Unionists.  As Dicey
noted, separation, while formally saving the Union, does so by completely re-configuring the Union
and the British Parliament – in fact it was Dicey’s view that Home Rule would even constitute implied
repeal of the Acts of Union.  He pointed out something that Labour proponents of Scottish Home
Rule as part of a UK-wide devolution to other cities and regions might also want to re-fresh
themselves on: giving increased powers to a unit understanding itself as a nation, is very different
from giving increased powers to a city or region not viewing itself as such, and carries different
implications for parliamentary sovereignty because it is of different constitutional significance. 
It is worth noting, however, that Dicey’s main objection against Home Rule was that it would not
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satisfy the mood for Irish independence.  He even turned from academy to political stump to promote
sedition.  Why re-configure the UK parliament and reduce England’s advantages (for many of his
arguments against the arrangements paradoxically were explicitly made as an Englishman rather
than a Unionist), for something that would not work and would merely fan the flames of, and become
a stepping-stone to, Irish independence anyway? 
Dicey put it graphically (with dare-I-say-it Salmond-esque rhetorical devilment): “Brandy is good, and
water is good; but when a neighbour asks for a glass of spirits, it is mockery to tender a glass of
water on the ground that both spirits and water are drink. The benevolent person who makes the offer
must not wonder if he receives no thanks.” 
In Scotland to-day, the difference is that a democratic vote has already seen voters chose the water
of home rule when offered the Brandy of independence – something the Scottish Government takes
care to state it fully accepts.  Nevertheless, as no fan of Dicey’s, I had a slightly surreal Diceyan
moment, when I heard Boris Johnson push for English-only votes at the Westminster parliament and
Scottish MP ‘removal’ as the triumph of preserving the Union.  Effective removal from Westminster in
return for Home Rule?  ‘Quite’, I could almost hear an invisible Scottish Nationalist respond, ‘but isn’t
that what we just asked for?’ 
Conversely, on finances the Scottish Government proposals put the hallowed Barnett Formula up for
grabs.  Surprising perhaps, but logically they must.  The (again century-old) maximum home rule
formula is that Scotland should legislate, spend and fund-raise for itself, and then make a small
subvention to the centre for the limited ‘reserved functions’ that remain.   This could resonate well to
Conservative ears in England.   Interestingly, Home Rule in Ireland involved debt and resource
allocation negotiations, as tied to subvention, and although no-one seems to mention it, debt
servicing is implicated in this devo-max model just as clearly as it was with independence.
What differs from a century ago, is that on Home Rule there now curiously appears to be signs of a
new English Unionist and Scottish Nationalist alliance on a separation model (unholy and fraught as
it will be). 
The consequences for the Union are fundamental.  A clear separation model of Union will mean a
Union whose continuing rationale depends on two matters being accepted as continuing: first, the
symbolic global capital of having a Union and a United Kingdom, and second the functional
usefulness of the Union for delivering macro-economic policy and defence on a territory-wide basis. 
Sharing. The second and different approach to Union is to attempt to place some inviolable
substance at its core, which cannot be unilaterally amended without the consent of all the devolved
bits.  This type of approach is typical of federalism.  Federal models achieve protection of the core by
placing fundamental values of the federation as only within the powers of all the constituent elements
of the federation to amend.  They typically involve an institutional model which requires (using a
variety of legal mechanisms) a level of consensus across the federation with regard to changing
federation-wide powers and quite often the values that are considered to bind the federation are put
even further beyond political reach, for example, because they are justiciable. 
Achieving this type of sharing model, appears to require the UK to throw out of its current unwritten
constitution and start again.  This would need a huge negotiation over a new written constitution
capable of re-working Parliament with some element of regional representation at the centre,
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perhaps a new regional second chamber, and full and extensive public consultation on what the
values of the federation are. 
All of this is out-with the remit of the Smith Commission or its timescale.  So Liberal Democrat
federal-style proposals which are the most coherent with regard to a sharing model, are unlikely to
carry much sway, and Labour recognising that this is ‘long-grass’ constitutional-reform want to throw
‘English Votes for English Laws’ into it.   
However, there is another more subtle alternative model of sharing that could also be viewed as in
continuity with the current British system.  This model is that of consociationalism – sometimes
referred to as ‘power-sharing’ - which with a bit of creative thinking could be operationalized
pragmatically without a never-ending big-bang constitutional reform process (because let’s face it,
British Constitutional reform has never been achieved this way  at home).
More detail on this anon, but in outline this model would involve effective legislative vetos for
devolved legislatures: putting the Sewell convention / legislative consent motions for all the UK’s
devolved regions, and also a new one for England (see McKay Commission) onto a legislative basis,
although perhaps a strong central government affirmation would do the trick.   This is not a terribly
dramatic departure from the current state of affairs.  Such a veto would protect and clarify devolved
power from unilateral UK amendment - because the Devolution Acts themselves could not be
amended without legislative consent (no doubt it would generate a slew of new PhDs on Dicey and
parliamentary sovereignty and whether it was law or politics that was prevailing, but prevail it would). 
However, requiring devolved legislative consent alone would not prevent the central government from
radically changing the central tenets of the Union, for example, by jettisoning the Human Rights Act,
or getting rid of the welfare state, or leaving the EU.  Protecting any substance to ‘the Union’ would
therefore also require placing a veto on the central government’s capacity to unilaterally amend the
Union’s substantive core. 
What then would be placed at the value-driven core of the Union – well ideally that is one for ‘the
people’, Constitutional conventions etc.  But pending all that, in fact there is substantial agreement to
be found in all the current proposals and in the current principles and values underpinning Union
reflected in current reserved powers: a common welfare platform below which no person can fall, a
commitment to a common floor of human rights which no devolved region can take its people below,
power to declare and make war, international membership and participation in international treaties,
and the status of the UK as monarchical. I like some of these and not others, and they are not fixed
for all time, but they reflect some common political commitment to UK-wide values.  The point is: that
if there is to be a substantive Union with values at its heart, until we negotiate new ones, consensus
decision-making across the devolved regions should govern the amendment of such ones as we
have. 
Could this type of sharing approach be achieved in the Smith time frame and remit, without a written
constitution?  Well yes: it would be possible to achieve this result pragmatically by the central
government committing to generating proposals relating to any change to core values, not from within
the UK Cabinet, but from within an executive body in which all the devolved regions were
represented and in which they had a form of veto power.  In fact, a version of such an executive body
already exists – the Joint Ministerial Committee.  This Committee is made up of the First Ministers of
the devolved regions (joint First and Deputy First in Northern Ireland’s case), abides by a form of
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collective responsibility, and deals with areas:
where it is necessary to ensure uniform arrangements for relations between the UK
Government and the three devolved administrations. In particular, broadly uniform
arrangements need to apply to: handling of matters with an EU dimension; financial
assistance to industry; and international relations touching on the responsibilities of the
devolved administrations.  (Devolution Memorandum of Understanding)
It could be a particularly ‘British’ constitutional solution to the problem of needing ‘two executives’ to
parallel the two Parliaments, to view this Ministerial Committee as a second UK-wide cabinet for
reserved powers and just go for the ‘two parliaments’ ‘two executives’ hook-line and sinker.
British Constitutional heresay?  Of course, any mention of consociationalism for the UK, will sound
like mad heresy to British constitutional ears.  However, that Dicey and his Parliamentary sovereignty
model came to prevail was more accident of history than some sort of long-standing constitutional
commitment (and of course this itself is very British).  In fact, Britain when faced with losing the ‘white
dominions’ of the empire post-first world war, seriously considered agreeing a fully federal empire as
a way of retaining that Union.  So the matter is not without its own British constitutional historical
precedent.  There are also of course obvious political objections, and I hope to address these in a
further blog. 
In conclusion, therefore, I would merely say for now, that while separation seems to be the attractive
model to Conservative Unionists and Nationalists, it will be much less attractive to Labour and
part-explains why their devolution proposals are the most limited.  It is not as simple as Westminster
Labour self-interest, or a failure to grasp post-referendum politics (as McLeish and McConnell
seemed to suggest a week ago).  Labour has a more existential difficulty because having fought for
‘home rule’ to save the Union, now the other shoe drops: a new separatist Union will be unable to
deliver the UK-wide social justice vision that made it worth saving in the first place. 
But, it is not without possibility that others could find reason to shift towards consociationalism and
hints of this are already emerging.  Should Nationalists find that in the horse trading they are getting
something less than the Home Rule that they want, there may be reasons to try to work to ensure
some sort of veto rights on issues such as social justice, human rights, and international relations
(read: welfare, ECHR, and EU).  Were they to so shift, they would soon find many allies in other
devolved regions as these same issues stand to collapse the Northern Ireland Executive, and push
the Welsh further into devolution-as-austerity-resistance. 
Labour could in consociationalism find a new way to marry home rule with its social justice
commitments for the UK as a whole, by being prepared to find common ground with the SNP on
social justice for the UK as a whole, through a ‘devolution-veto’ mechanism. 
Similarly, Tories may well re-discover the appeal of old-fashioned Unionism and find become
prepared to pay the price to the devolved regions for something of more ambitious value than a new
little England.  More cynically, any Tory wanting to back-stop against Farage without turning into UKIP
themselves (never a great strategy for electorally defeating more radical opponents), could well find
the ‘need for devolved regional veto’ a useful way to tie their own hands.  With a bit of leadership and
a good speech this might even be something they could sell to the middle-ground as both British, and
progressively Conservative and Unionist, the sell that got Cameron into government in the first place
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and urgently needs resurrected if the conservatives want to retain power. 
Despite its current lack of popularity and its heretical flavour, with a bit of vision all round, surprising
as it may sound, sharing could hold the most space for middle ground across the political spectrum,
and produce the most coherent constitutional arrangements and the greatest degree of political
consensus within Scotland and across the UK. 
Is it really so impossible that such a vision and consensus could emerge and receive bi-partisan
central commitment through next year’s general elections?
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